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PENCIL ME IN: THE USE OF TITLE IX AND § 1983 TO OBTAIN
EQUAL TREATMENT IN HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETICS SCHEDULING
By Leigh E. Ferrin*

I

n 1998, Communities for Equity, a non-profit organization constitution. This case note asserts that future plaintiffs,
comprised of female high school student-athletes in defendants, and judges would benefit from a Supreme Court
Michigan and their parents, sued the Michigan High School decision resolving the circuit split.
Athletic Association (hereafter “MHSAA”). 1 Communities for
COMMUNITIES FOR EQUITY V. MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL
Equity alleged that the MHSAA discriminated against female
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
high school athletes by scheduling girls’ sports in different
2
seasons than boys’ sports.
A. PARTIES
After eight years of litigation, the Sixth Circuit, on remand
from the United States Supreme Court, affirmed the district
Communities for Equity was formed due to a concern that
court’s holding that the MHSAA was (and still is) in violation of discrimination by the MHSAA would impact the female athletes’
Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Michigan civil psychological well-being, as well as their ability to continue their
rights act known as the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.3 The athletic education in college. 8 The case was filed as a class
Sixth Circuit also held that the federal statutory claim (the Title action, with the class defined as all current and future female
IX claim) did not preclude Communities for Equity’s equal high school student-athletes in Michigan and their parents.9
protection claim under § 1983.4 The implication of this decision
The MHSAA is a non-profit organization in charge of high
is that Communities for Equity will now have the full array of school sports in Michigan. The MHSAA decides which sports to
remedies, including injunctive
sanction; when to schedule
relief, declaratory relief, and
games; how, when and where
Non-traditional season scheduling
monetary damages, from the
subjects the female athletes to heightened to o r g a n iz e s t a t e w id e
organization in violation and the
championship tournaments;
individuals responsible for the dis- risk of injury and reduces their chances of
and what rules the high
being recruited by college coaches.
criminatory treatment. The
schools must abide by.10
MHSAA appealed the Sixth
While not officially a state
Circuit’s decision to the United States Supreme Court, arguing organization, the state of Michigan has essentially ceded control
that Title IX precluded Communities for Equity from also bring- of its high school athletics to the MHSAA, and the majority of
ing constitutional claims under § 1983.5 The Supreme Court the tournaments are held in state-owned facilities or properties.11
denied certiorari,6 so the MHSAA will now be required to In addition, public school administrators make up the majority of
implement a previously approved compliance plan. Different the MHSAA advisory committee.12 Therefore, the district court
remedies are available under each of the two causes of action, so found that the MHSAA was a state actor for purposes of the
if Title IX were to preclude a plaintiff from bringing an equal Fourteenth Amendment and a recipient of federal funds for the
protection claim under § 1983, that plaintiff may be denied ac- purposes of Title IX.13
cess to certain remedies.
B. ASSERTED CLAIMS
This case note analyzes whether a Title IX claim should
preclude a constitutional claim brought under § 1983, an issue on
Communities for Equity sought to establish an equal
which the circuits are split. After the Sixth Circuit’s holding in protection claim under § 1983, as well as claims under Title IX
Communities for Equity, three circuits agree that a Title IX claim and the Michigan state Civil Rights Act. The allegations were
does not preclude an equal protection claim under § 1983, while based on the fact that the MHSAA treats Michigan high school
three circuits have reached the opposite conclusion.7 Part II sets female athletes differently than their male counterparts. Six of
out the facts and disposition of Communities for Equity v. the fourteen sports offered for females in Michigan are played in
Michigan High School Athletic Association. Part III analyzes their non-traditional seasons; whereas, all fourteen of the sports
Title IX, § 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause, and the offered for males are played in their traditional seasons. A
interaction between the three. This section also contains an “traditional” season is considered to be the season in which the
explanation of the cases and the legislative intent behind the sport is usually played and generally corresponds to when the
preclusion of a § 1983 claim by a Title IX claim. Part IV sport is sponsored by the National Collegiate Athletic
discusses the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and the reasons for the Association (hereafter “NCAA”).14 For example, girls’
circuit split. Finally, Part V concludes that the Sixth Circuit’s basketball in Michigan is played in the fall instead of the winter,
reasoning better comports with congressional intent, and furthers girls’ volleyball is played in the winter instead of the fall, and
the important social goals embodied in Title IX and our federal girls’ soccer is played in the spring instead of the fall.15 This
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schedule was originally adopted when Michigan introduced
girls’ high school sports in the 1970s.16 The purpose was to
ensure that the girls’ sports were not interfering with the boys’
sports.17
Non-traditional season scheduling subjects the female
athletes to heightened risk of injury18 and reduces their chances
of being recruited by college coaches.19 Gender-based
discrimination can also influence females’ future career options
and earning power, as well as their mental health.20
C. CASE DISPOSITION

In August 2006, the Sixth Circuit held that Title IX contained no
comprehensive enforcement scheme indicating that Congress
intended to preclude recovery under § 1983 for an equal
protection claim.34
Most recently, in January 2007, the MHSAA appealed to
the United States Supreme Court to resolve two issues, one of
which was whether Title IX should have precluded the plaintiffs
from bringing their equal protection claim under § 1983.35 The
Court has denied certiorari36 and the MHSAA has run out of
appeals. All that is left now in Communities for Equity is the
discussion surrounding the compliance plan accepted by the
district court in 2002.37

While Communities for Equity originally alleged seven
violations of Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act,21 all claims except for the non22
traditional season claim were settled prior to trial. In 2001, the
A. TITLE IX
Federal District Court in the Western District of Michigan held
that the MHSAA’s current scheduling of high school girls’
Social scientists have established that the physical and
sports in Michigan was in violation of Title IX, the Equal emotional benefits of education and athletics are many: girls
Protection Clause, and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.23 who participate in athletics have fewer instances of depression;
The court ordered the MHSAA to submit a compliance plan they are less likely to become teen mothers; they are less likely
within six months, outlining how the violations would be to become obese; and they are more likely to graduate from high
remedied.24 The first plan that the MHSAA submitted left “girls school and go to college.38 Despite these positive results,
throughout the state in
women are still discouraged
disadvantageous seasons in
from participating in athletics.39
Social
scientists
have
established
that
the
basketball, volleyball and
Nationwide, male high school
physical and emotional benefits of
soccer.”25 Having rejected the
athletes receive 1.2 million more
MHSAA’s plan, the court
education and athletics are many: girls
participation opportunities than
created three plans for the
female high school athletes.40 In
who participate in athletics have fewer
MHSAA and allowed them to
some states, the difference
instances of depression; they are less
choose which version they
between opportunities is only a
likely to become teen mothers; they are
would rather implement.26 The
few thousand; in other states, the
less likely to become obese; and they are
MHSAA chose to switch girls’
high schools offer close to twice
basketball and girls’ volleyball
as many opportunities for male
more likely to graduate from high school
to their traditional seasons; to
high school athletes as they offer
and go to college.
switch two of the remaining
for female high school athletes.41
four girls’ sports to their
Those women’s teams that are
traditional season; and to switch two boys’ teams to their non- established often receive less funding, less attention, and less
traditional seasons.27 In the fall of 2007, the MHSAA is support than their male counterparts.42 Additionally, studies
beginning to implement the compliance plan and, after nine have found that 85% of females between the eighth and eleventh
years of litigation, Michigan female athletes are finally seeing grades experience some form of sexual harassment.43
relief.28
Congress’ recognition of the significant problems in
The district court stayed its decision pending appeal.29 The education and athletics led them to enact Title IX of the
MHSAA appealed the district court’s decision to the Sixth Education Amendments of 1972.44 The legislative history
Circuit Court of Appeals and lost.30 The MHSAA then appealed indicates that the principle purpose of Title IX was to prevent
to the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing that federal funds from being used for discriminatory practices,
Communities for Equity’s equal protection claim under § 1983 which is why the only express remedy written into the statute is
was subsumed by their Title IX claim.31 The Supreme Court the removal of federal funding.45 A secondary purpose was to
declined to decide the case and remanded it to the Sixth Circuit provide a remedy for individuals affected by discriminatory
to reconsider their holding in light of the Court’s recent holding practices.46 The Supreme Court reinforced this secondary
in Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams.32 The MHSAA conceded purpose in 1979 when it decided Cannon v. University of
that they were subject to Title IX for the purposes of the appeal Chicago, holding that there was a private right of action implicit
and claimed that Title IX precluded the plaintiffs from bringing in Title IX.47 Congress intended Title IX to apply to educational
the equal protection claim, even though the MHSAA adamantly institutions, including high schools, as long as they received
argued that Title IX did not apply to them in the court below.33 federal funding.48 At these institutions, discrimination in
16
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employment,49 admission programs,50 athletic programs,51
institution had notice and an opportunity to remedy
scholarship awards,52 sexual harassment,53 and retaliation are all
the situation. 67 An institution cannot be held liable
54
covered by Title IX. If a policy or circumstance discriminates
for monetary damages for the actions of a rogue
employee.68
on the basis of sex or acts as a barrier to a female participating
in educational or extracurricular activities, it would be a
B. SECTION 1983 AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
violation of Title IX.
There are two procedural mechanisms for asserting a Title
Section 198369 is the primary means by which an individual
IX claim. Written into the statute is an administrative proce- can obtain damages from state officials for violations of federal
dure, whereby a Title IX complaint could be filed with the U.S. statutory and constitutional law.70 Section 1983 was enacted by
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (hereafter Congress in 1871, under section five of the Fourteenth
“OCR”).55 Pursuant to the statute, OCR then conducts an inves- Amendment, in order to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
tigation to determine if federal funding should be removed from Amendment.71 The purpose was to protect individual U.S.
the institution.56 The Cannon Court held that there is an implied residents from discriminatory actions by state actors abusing
private right of action in Title IX, meaning that an individual their authority.72 Section 1983 can be used to enforce all federal
plaintiff can bring a lawsuit against the institution alleged to be constitutional and statutory provisions.73
in violation.57 Using the Cort v. Ash58 factors, the Court in CanThe Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
non found that: (1) the plaintiff was a member of the class that to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part, “[n]o
Title IX was intended to protect; (2) the legislative history indi- State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
cated Congress’ intent to create a private right of action for the protection of the laws.”74 The Fourteenth Amendment was enperson discriminated against on the basis of her sex; (3) the im- acted in 1868 to provide protection to African Americans but
plication of a private right of action was consistent with the en- has since been expanded to cover discrimination against other
forcement of Title IX; and (4) this was not an area of particular impacted groups, such as women.75 Under section five, the proconcern to the states.59
hibition on discrimination is applicable to the states.76
The question then is: what relief can a plaintiff bringing a
Under a § 1983 claim for a violation of the Equal Protection
Title IX claim receive? The primary remedy for Title IX Clause, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is a state actor
plaintiffs is the removal of federal funding from the institution or is acting under color of state law.77 Included are private
found in violation.60 Removing federal funding, however, does organizations using state funds or public facilities or engaging in
not necessarily eliminate the discrimination. As an alternative activities of the state that the state has entrusted to the private
and preferred remedy, courts can order the institution to elimi- organization.78 To establish an equal protection claim of sex
nate the discrimination through a court-sanctioned compliance discrimination, the plaintiff must show that the state actor has
plan.61 The content of compliance plans can vary greatly — treated one sex differently from the other sex.79 The burden then
from equalizing funding, to establishing a new team, or moving
shifts to the defendant to show
a girls’ sport to its traditional seathat there is an important
son.62 The second problem with
governmental objective behind
The primary remedy for Title IX
the defunding remedy is that it
the differential treatment, and that
plaintiffs is the removal of
does not redress the harm that the
the means chosen are substandiscrimination has already done to
federal funding from the institution
tially related to the achievement
the plaintiff. Damages are not
found in violation.
of those objectives.80 A plaintiff
available for unintentional violausing § 1983 to bring a claim untions of the statute.63 However,
der the Fourteenth Amendment
attorneys’ fees are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which al- can receive injunctive, declaratory, and/or pecuniary relief. Inlows recovery of attorneys’ fees in suits involving violations of junctive relief is allowed only when a plaintiff can show that
plaintiffs’ civil rights.64
there is a possibility that they will again be deprived of their
There are two significant limitations to the Title IX
relief. The first is that relief, whether or not it is
defunding, elimination of the discrimination
through a compliance plan, or monetary damages
can be obtained only from an institution receiving
federal funding.65 A particular individual who
engaged in a discriminatory act cannot be sued
under the statute.66 The second limitation is that, in
order to pursue relief under Title IX, the plaintiff
must show that “an appropriate person” at the
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constitutional or statutory rights in the future. As with Title IX,
successful plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 1988
because there has been a violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights.81
C. TITLE IX AND § 1983 INTERACTION
Because Title IX was enacted with the purpose of
eliminating discrimination82 and § 1983 was enacted to provide
an enforcement mechanism for federal statutory and
constitutional rights,83 a plaintiff bringing a claim under Title IX
often has a concurrent constitutional or statutory claim under
17

§ 1983. However, not every federal statute can be enforced
through § 1983 because certain federal statutes have been
written so as to preclude a § 1983 action for violation of the
statute.84 This is the case when Congress has intended the
statutory remedy to be exclusive, or when the enforcement
scheme in the statute is so comprehensive that enforcement
under § 1983 would be incompatible.85
1. SECTION 1983 INTERACTION USED TO ENFORCE A
STATUTORY RIGHT

recognized that in only two other instances had the “existence of
more restrictive remedies...in the violated statute itself” led to
the conclusion that § 1983 was unavailable to remedy violations
of a statute.98 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens pointed out
that “only an exceptional case — such as one involving an
unusually comprehensive and exclusive statutory scheme — will
lead us to conclude that a given statute impliedly forecloses a
§ 1983 remedy.”99 Stevens recognized that the Court normally
presumes Congress intended to provide, not preclude, a remedy
under § 1983 to enforce federal statutory rights.100

In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Middlesex County
2. SECTION 1983 INTERACTION USED TO ENFORCE A
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,86
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
holding that plaintiffs’ claims under the Federal Water Pollution
In slightly different circumstances, the Court in Smith v.
Control Act (hereafter “FWPCA”) and the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (hereafter “MPRSA”) Robinson101 held that where the constitutional claims pursuant to
precluded plaintiffs’ use of § 1983 to obtain damages under § 1983 were “virtually identical” to the statutory claims, the §
1983 claims were precluded.102 In
those same statutes.87 Notably, the
plaintiffs first asked that the Court
Smith, the plaintiff was alleging
recognize an implied private right
violations of the Education of the
Because Title IX was enacted with
of action under both the FWPCA
Handicapped Act (hereafter
the purpose of eliminating
88
and the MPRSA. The Court deas well as violations of
discrimination and § 1983 was enacted “EHA”),
clined to do so, reasoning that the
the Equal Protection and Due
to provide an enforcement mechanism
“Acts contain[ed] unusually
Process Clauses under § 1983.103
for federal statutory and constitutional As opposed to National Sea Clamelaborate enforcement provimers and Abrams, in Smith,
§
sions,” which indicated that Conrights, a plaintiff bringing a claim
1983
was
being
used
to
enforce
a
gress did not intend “to authorunder Title IX often has a concurrent
constitutional right, rather than to
ize…additional judicial remedies
constitutional or statutory claim
obtain monetary damages under
for private citizens.”89
under § 1983.
The Court then turned to the
the federal statute in question.
question of whether the
The Court again looked
plaintiffs could use § 1983 to colto the provisions of the statute
lect damages for violations of the FWPCA and the MPRSA, itself and to Congressional intent to determine whether Congress
because neither of the statutes provided a remedy authorizing intended EHA plaintiffs with constitutional rights to be able to
monetary damages.90 Both of the statutes contained comprehen- pursue those claims outside of the remedies set out in the
sive remedial schemes, such as: provisions for civil suits EHA.104 The EHA provides for an elaborate remedial process,
brought by the government, civil or criminal penalties for viola- beginning on the local level, with the parents making numerous
tions, judicial review of the government’s enforcement attempts appeals before the School Committee and the Associate Comand express citizen-suits which allow an individual to sue for missioner of Education.105 The procedural safeguards in place
injunctive relief.91 In analyzing “whether Congress had fore- were designed to provide due process to the parents of a handiclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment it- capped child when the State planned to make changes to their
self,”92 the Court focused on the numerous specific statutory child’s education.106 EHA plaintiffs also have a right to judicial
remedies in the FWPCA and the MPRSA. It particularly focused review of the State agency’s decisions.107 The Court felt
on the citizen-suit provisions, as an indication that Congress strongly that Congress intended for remedies available under the
“intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be EHA to be exclusive, because Congress indicated the importance of the “the parents and the local education agency work
available under § 1983.”93
More recently, in Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,94 the [ing] together to formulate an individualized plan for each
Court followed National Sea Clammers and held that a plaintiff handicapped child’s education.”108 In the end, the Court relied
bringing a claim under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 most heavily on its perception of Congress’ intent that the EHA
(hereafter “TCA”) could not use § 1983 to obtain monetary be the exclusive remedy for a handicapped child being denied a
damages.95 Using a similar analysis, the Court asked “whether free and appropriate public education.109 The Court determined
Congress meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by [the that allowing a right of action under § 1983 to enforce the EHA
TCA] to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a § 1983 would be “inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored
action.”96 The TCA provided for an individual to obtain judicial scheme.”110
review of an unfavorable zoning decision.97 The Court
18
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THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING IN COMMUNITIES FOR
EQUITY AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. TITLE IX’S REMEDY IS NOT COMPREHENSIVE
The issue of whether Title IX precludes a plaintiff from also
bringing a constitutional claim under § 1983 is important for
several reasons. One of the primary reasons is that § 1983 and
Title IX apply to different defendants. Both individual
defendants and institutions or organizations may be held liable
for violations of a person’s constitutional and federal statutory
rights under § 1983, as long as the defendant acted under color
of state law.111 Title IX is a federal statute with a more limited
scope and assigns liability only to “educational program[s]” or
“activities receiving Federal financial assistance.”112 This is
particularly important when the discrimination is a result of a
particular individual’s actions, such as in a sexual harassment
case. Discrimination resulting from an athletic or educational
program usually involves an institutional problem, though
occasionally there are particular individuals that have the power
to remedy discriminatory treatment.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the primary question
for the Sixth Circuit in Communities for Equity was whether or
not Title IX precluded the plaintiffs from bringing an equal
protection claim under § 1983.113 First, the Sixth Circuit
recognized that in both National Sea Clammers and Abrams, the
plaintiffs brought a federal statutory claim and then used § 1983
to assert those same federal statutory rights.114 The statutes in
those cases did not authorize monetary damages, so the plaintiffs
attempted to use § 1983 to obtain damages. The Communities
for Equity court said that allowing a § 1983 claim for damages
would clearly “create an end-run around the substantive
statutory remedies and contravene Congress’ intent.”115 The
Sixth Circuit distinguished National Sea Clammers and Abrams
from the instant case because Communities for Equity was
asserting a constitutional claim under § 1983, not using § 1983
to obtain damages under Title IX.116
The court looked to Smith to provide the framework for its
analysis.117 The first question was: “whether Congress intended
to abandon the rights and remedies set forth in Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection jurisprudence when it enacted Title
IX in 1972.”118 The second question was: whether Title IX
provided a remedy comprehensive enough to be exclusive?119
The Sixth Circuit noted that these two questions were to be
independently evaluated, and that if both were not met, then the
statute would not preclude a constitutional claim under
§1983.120 In other words, if one factor is clearly unsatisfied, then
the other prong does not need to be discussed.121
The court chose to address the second prong first, and
examined Congress’ intent when they were enacting Title IX in
1972.122 In 1996, the Sixth Circuit in Lillard v. Shelby County
Board of Education,123 held that Title IX does not preclude a
plaintiff from using § 1983 to bring a substantive due process
claim.124 Following Lillard, the court in Communities for Equity
Special Summer-Fall 2007

distinguished the express remedies in Title IX from the
comprehensive administrative and judicial remedies set out in
the EHA.125 The only express remedy written into Title IX is a
“procedure for the termination of federal financial support for
institutions” in violation of Title IX.126 The court further
recognized that if Title IX did not exist, Communities for Equity
would still have a cause of action under the Equal Protection
Clause. 127 This reasoning indicates that the two claims are
separate, despite the fact that the claims arise from the same set
of underlying facts.
As with most other defendants who have challenged a
plaintiff’s right to recover under both Title IX and § 1983, the
MHSAA relies on the implied private right of action in its
argument.128 The MHSAA argued that because a Title IX
plaintiff has available to it the full range of remedies, Title IX is
comprehensive enough to preclude recovery under § 1983.129
The Sixth Circuit did not agree with this position.130 Instead, the
court used the implied private right of action as evidence of
Congress’ intent not to limit a Title IX plaintiff’s claims to the
express remedy in the statute itself.131
B. CIRCUITS THAT DISAGREE WITH THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, over the last
seventeen years, have all held that a plaintiff bringing a claim
under Title IX cannot also bring a claim under § 1983.132 The
three courts have reached the same conclusion in four diverse
cases but have all relied on the reasoning expressed by the
Supreme Court in National Sea Clammers.133 The most
discussed issue was whether or not Title IX provided a comprehensive remedy for plaintiffs.
In 1990, the Third Circuit held that Pfeiffer, a student who
was dismissed from the local chapter of the National Honor
Society due to her pregnancy, could not bring both a Title IX
and an equal protection claim under § 1983.134 The court relied
on the district court’s reasoning on this issue and said, “[t]he Sea
Clammers doctrine has been applied consistently in analogous
cases.”135 Three years later, the Third Circuit again faced the
question of whether a Title IX claim precluded a § 1983
claim.136 This time, the district court had previously decided the
constitutional claim, and the Third Circuit was analyzing the
issue on appeal.137 The court relied on the previous decision in
Pfeiffer, and “the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts
should exercise restraint before reaching federal constitutional
claims.”138 The court explained that the “Supreme Court has
made clear that where a federal statute provides its own
comprehensive enforcement scheme, Congress intended to
foreclose a right of action under § 1983.”139 The court stated
that it considered Title IX’s enforcement scheme to be
comprehensive; thus, it precluded recovery under § 1983.140
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit faced the issue in a case
involving employment discrimination.141 Ultimately, the court
held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative
remedies under Title VII before resorting to sex discrimination
claims under Title IX.142 On its way to that conclusion,
19

however, the court discussed whether the remedies provided by
Title IX precluded the plaintiff from bringing an equal
protection claim under § 1983, arising from the same set of
facts.143 The Seventh Circuit read National Sea Clammers to
indicate that when a statute and a constitutional provision
“prohibit the same kind of conduct and provide compensatory
and punitive damages as remedies for that conduct,” that type of

… a plaintiff specifically claiming
intentional discrimination cannot
allege that she has causes of action under
both Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause through § 1983.

overlap with her Title IX claim, she would not be allowed to
bring both causes of action.
The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have spent little
time discussing the issue. The most popular reasoning was that
because Title IX is considered to have an implied private right of
action plaintiffs have access to all possible remedies. 157
Therefore, Congress did not intend for plaintiffs to have access
to a remedy under § 1983 as well.158 The Sixth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits have recognized that because the private right of
action in Title IX is implied, Congress likely did not intend for
the explicit remedies in Title IX to be exclusive.
C. CIRCUITS THAT SIDE WITH THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that a Title IX
claim does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing a concurrent
constitutional claim under § 1983.159 These circuits have agreed
144
Based on the Third Circuit’s with the Sixth Circuit that the Title IX remedial scheme is not
overlap is “intolerable.”
decisions in Pfeiffer and Williams, the court said a plaintiff comprehensive. The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have read
specifically claiming intentional discrimination cannot allege the Supreme Court’s decision in National Sea Clammers as a
that she has causes of action under both Title IX and the Equal way of distinguishing federal statutes from each other. The
Protection Clause through § 1983.145 The court decided that three circuits examined not only the explicit remedies provided
Congress did not intend for individual officials to remedy in Title IX, but also the legislative history of Title IX. The courts
alleged instances of discrimination, but rather placed the burden concluded that Congress did not intend for the remedies
squarely on the institution itself.146 To that end, the Seventh provided in Title IX to be the exclusive remedies available to a
Circuit held that Congress did intend for the remedial scheme in plaintiff.
In Crawford v. Davis,160 the plaintiff, suing under Title IX
Title IX to be exclusive. 147 Thus, the Title IX claim, if it were
148
and the Equal Protection Clause, made an allegation of sexual
allowed in this case, would subsume the § 1983 claim.
Finally, the Second Circuit had an opportunity to decide this harassment.161 The Eighth Circuit stated that “Sea Clammers in
issue in 1998.149 The plaintiff brought a hostile environment no way restricts a plaintiff’s ability to seek redress via § 1983
sexual harassment claim against the school district, under both for the violation of independently existing constitutional
Title IX and § 1983.150 The court rejected the use of § 1983 to rights.”162 The court said this is true even if the constitutional
enforce the plaintiff’s Title IX rights and also rejected a right arises from the same set of facts as the Title IX rights.163
constitutional rights exception to the National Sea Clammers Although the Supreme Court found an implied private right of
doctrine.151 The Second Circuit stated that there was an intricate action in Title IX, the court saw the removal of federal funding
administrative enforcement scheme in Title IX, whereby an as the only express remedy.164 The court compared Title IX’s
express remedy to the enforcement
individual could file a complaint
scheme in the statutes in National Sea
with OCR, which would then conThe most popular reasoning
Clammers, which contained elaborate
duct an investigation.152 The court
was that because Title IX is
procedures including citizen suits and
also explained that the fact that the
considered
to
have
an
implied
enforcement by government agencies.165
Supreme Court had found an
The Eighth Circuit felt that if Congress
private right of action
implied private right of action for
intended for Title IX to preclude a claim
Title IX convinced the court that
plaintiffs have access to all
under § 1983, the enforcement scheme in
“the Title IX plaintiff has access to
possible remedies.
153
Title IX would have been more elaborate,
a full panoply of remedies.” The
similar to the schemes in the statutes in
Second Circuit felt that the circuits
that had found the private right of action to be outside the National Sea Clammers.166
The Tenth Circuit was also dealing with a sexual
statutory enforcement scheme had read the remedies available
too narrowly.154 In rejecting a constitutional rights exception, harassment lawsuit when this issue arose.167 Similar to the
the court relied on their previous reasoning and the analysis in Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held that § 1983 claims are not
Smith.155 When a statute contains a “sufficiently comprehensive supplanted by the private right of action implicit in Title IX.168
enforcement scheme,” as the court believed Title IX did, the Title IX plaintiffs who bring a constitutional claim under § 1983
indication is that Congress intended to replace § 1983 as an “do not circumvent Title IX procedures or gain access to
available remedy.156 This means that if a plaintiff were asserting remedies not available under Title IX.”169 It reasoned that Title
a violation of a constitutional right under § 1983, which did not IX plaintiffs have the whole panoply of remedies available to
20
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them,170 so bringing a concurrent constitutional claim through §
1983 does not allow plaintiffs to get damages they otherwise
would not be entitled to under Title IX.
D. OTHER COURTS’ RULINGS THAT SIDE WITH
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

alternative and express cause of action under Title VI.” 184 Thus,
he reasoned that § 1983 remedies would also be permissible
under Title IX.
The result of the preceding analysis is that, of the courts that
have faced this issue, only three Circuit Courts of Appeals have
held that Title IX does preclude a constitutional claim under §
1983. Three circuits have expressly held that Title IX does not
preclude a § 1983 claim, and lower courts in three other circuits
have reached the same conclusion. As the judge in Old
Rochester mentioned, “[u]nfortunately... [no] subsequent
Supreme Court decisions give a clear lead.”185 At the same time
that the Old Rochester judge was issuing his opinion, his
colleague in the same district was issuing the opposite holding in
a companion case.186 The fact that two judges within the same
district are coming to different conclusions speaks to the need of
a decision from the First Circuit. A decision from the Supreme
Court would give the First Circuit, and all of the other circuits,
guidance for future decisions. A Supreme Court decision on this
important issue would also prevent delays and provide guidance
to plaintiffs and defendants who are alleging and defending Title
IX claims.

The Fifth Circuit has implied that, if squarely presented
with the issue, it would likely hold that Title IX’s remedial
scheme was not “sufficiently comprehensive to indicate... that
Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 suits based upon rights
created by Title IX.”171 The plaintiff’s claims in Lakoski v.
James were employment discrimination claims, so the Fifth
Circuit held that Title VII precluded all other claims, including
the Title IX and constitutional claims brought under § 1983.172
Although the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of Title IX and § 1983 in
this case was dicta, it gives us an idea of what to expect from
that court.
Lower federal courts in other circuits have also come to the
similar conclusion that a plaintiff is allowed to bring both a Title
IX claim and a constitutional claim under § 1983.173 Alston v.
Virginia High School League174 involved an issue similar to the
one presented in Communities for Equity.175 Plaintiffs
TITLE IX SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE A CONSTITUTIONAL
contended that the Virginia High School League (hereafter
CLAIM UNDER § 1983
“VHSL”) discriminated on the basis of sex because boys’ sports
were uniformly scheduled across school classifications, but
All of the federal circuit courts have recognized that the
girls’ sports were not.176 The result was that if the size of the only enforcement mechanism expressly authorized by Title IX is
school required it to switch from
the withdrawal of federal funds,
one classification to another,
and that the private right of acA Supreme Court decision
some girls might be prevented
tion under Title IX is implied.
on this important issue
from playing sports they
Where the courts disagree is
would also prevent delays
previously played if two of their
whether those two remedies,
sports were in the same seaand provide guidance to plaintiffs
taken together, are sufficiently
son.177 Just like the MHSAA, the
comprehensive to bar the pursuit
and defendants who are alleging
VHSL challenged the plaintiff’s
of a constitutional claim under §
and defending
ability to bring both a Title IX
1983.187 Previously, when the
Title IX claims.
claim and an equal protection
Supreme Court has held that a
178
However, the court
claim.
federal statute precludes a plainrejected the challenge.179 Instead, it recognized that “the Na- tiff from also bringing a federal constitutional claim, it has reational Sea Clammers doctrine ‘speaks only to whether federal soned that allowing both claims would allow the plaintiff to restatutory rights can be enforced both through the statute itself cover twice for the same right.188 The interaction between Title
and through section 1983’; it does not ‘stand for the proposition IX and the Equal Protection Clause does not present that probthat a federal statutory scheme can preempt independently exist- lem. While the claims under Title IX and § 1983 may generally
ing constitutional rights, which have contours distinct from the arise from the same set of facts, a plaintiff asserting a constitustatutory claim.’”180
tional right in addition to a federal statutory claim is asserting a
Finally, a district court in the First Circuit analogized Title different right.
IX to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.181 The court
A. POSSIBLE SUPREME COURT RULING
noted that in Cannon, the Supreme Court found that “the only
difference between the two statutes is the ‘substitution of the
Future plaintiffs will certainly bring Title IX suits that
word ‘sex’ in Title IX to replace the words ‘race, color or include equal protection claims, and the defendants will try to
national origin’ in ‘Title VI’.”182 The judge in Doe v. Old argue that the Title IX claim precludes an equal protection claim
Rochester Regional School District spent a significant amount of brought under § 1983. This argument should fail for several
his opinion discussing the possibility of Title IX prohibiting a reasons. First, Title IX applies only to federally-funded
concurrent § 1983 claim.183 The judge noted that the Supreme institutions, so individuals cannot be held liable for
Court has held that § 1983 remedies are considered to be “an discrimination under Title IX. Depending on the type of claim,
Special Summer-Fall 2007
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this could hamper a plaintiff’s ability to remedy the alleged discriminatory treatment. Because Communities for Equity
discrimination. Second, although a defendant is considered to be involves teenage females, the issue is more urgent. It is hard to
a state actor under the Equal Protection Clause of the fully understand or know the damage that could be done to a
Fourteenth Amendment, that does not necessarily mean that they female who is repeatedly discriminated against. Additionally,
are a recipient of federal funds. Thus, allowing both avenues of females who are discriminated against in high school athletics
recovery for a plaintiff could increase the likelihood that a are denied opportunities to participate in athletics in college.
defendant would be subject to liability for discriminatory While the individual female certainly suffers from
treatment.
discrimination, so too does her community, because that
If the Supreme Court adheres to the path set out in National particular female is less likely to be an active participant in poliSea Clammers, Abrams, and Smith, it seems likely that the Court tics, in the economy, and in life in general. These consequences
would hold that Title IX does
may sound drastic, but that does
not preclude a constitutional
not make them less likely. More
Resolving the circuit split surrounding
claim under § 1983. The Court
importantly, less extreme consehas previously looked at the
quences would be no more acwhether or not Title IX precludes a
explicit language of the statute
ceptable.
constitutional claim under § 1983, in
and the congressional intent at
Resolving the circuit
the time of enactment. As dis- accordance with the Sixth Circuit’s holding, split surrounding whether or not
cussed above, the express lanTitle IX precludes a constituwill discourage future discrimination.
guage of Title IX provides for a
tional claim under § 1983, in
very limited administrative remaccordance with the Sixth Ciredy and no private right of action. The fact that the Court has cuit’s holding, will discourage future discrimination. It will
found an implied private right of action in Title IX should not provide Title IX plaintiffs with an additional remedy when
affect its decision. What is significant is that Congress took no faced with discrimination. It will also encourage educational
action after the Court’s decision in Cannon to amend Title IX. institutions to be more careful in their treatment of females. If
This failure to act indicated Congress’ intent to allow for addi- the Supreme Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit, the institution
tional remedies, outside of those explicitly stated in the statute. as a whole and the individuals in charge of enforcing discriminaBased on precedent, and the holdings of the previous cases in- tory policies will be liable for discriminatory treatment. Finally,
volving federal statutory claims and separate constitutional a resolution of this issue will also promote judicial economy.
claims under § 1983, if the Supreme Court decides the issue in a Since the parties will not have to argue whether or not Title IX
future case, it should find that a plaintiff is allowed to bring both precludes a constitutional claim under § 1983 in future cases,
a Title IX claim and a federal constitutional claim under § 1983.
plaintiffs and defendants will know which claims are allowed
and will focus their efforts on proving or defending those claims.

VI. CONCLUSION

While much of the discussion in this note has involved the
legal issues surrounding Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause, what is equally important is that the purposes of antidiscrimination laws are recognized. Both Title IX and the Equal
Protection Clause prohibit females from being subjected to
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